A Short History of U.S. Democracy

Nikhil Mahadea
7 min readMay 5, 2022

The system was criticized as too closed. The organization men weren’t representative of American society. They were the very definition of an “old boys” network. The poor, politically unconnected, women, and minorities, weren’t represented in the smoke-filled rooms and were thus excluded from the presidential nomination process.

Democrats adopted proportional rules in many states and mechanisms to enhance the representation of women and minorities.

The Electoral College

For Hamilton and the founding fathers, elections required some kind of built-in screening device to protect from populist strongmen. The device they came up with was the Electoral College.

In the early 19th century, presidential candidates were chosen by groups of congressmen in Washington — known as Congressional Caucuses. Party insiders provided “peer review.” Mayors, senators, and congressional representatives knew the candidates personally. They worked with them and were thus well-positioned to evaluate their character, judgment, and ability to operate under stress.

In all the States — except where there are presidential primaries — these men practically hand-pick the delegates to the national conventions. Smoke-filled back rooms served as a screening mechanism — helping to keep out the kind of demagogues and extremists who derailed democracy elsewhere in the world. American party gatekeeping was so effective that outsiders simply couldn’t win. As a result, most didn’t even try.

The path to national recognition ran through a few mainstream channels that favored establishment politicians over extremists.

For example, when Henry Ford harbored serious presidential ambitions, he was born a century too soon. What mattered far more than public opinion was the opinion of party leaders. They soundly rejected him.

Lindbergh, speaking nationwide on behalf of the America First Committee, emerged as one of America’s most prominent isolationists in 1939 and 1944. He was extraordinarily popular with speeches drawing large crowds. In 1939, according to Paul Palmer, Reader’s Digest editor, his radio addresses generated more mail than those of any other person in America. However, not only did Lindbergh not appear at the convention, but his name never even came up. Gatekeeping worked.

The McGovern–Fraser Commission

Senator Abraham Ribicoff’s nomination speech for antiwar candidate George McGovern, decried “the gestapo tactics” of the Chicago police, looking — on live television — directly at Mayor Daley. As confrontations exploded on the convention floor, uniformed police officers dragged several delegates from the auditorium. Watching in shock, NBC anchor Chet Huntley observed, “This surely is the first time policemen have ever entered the floor of a convention.

With that, the Democrats created the McGovern–Fraser Commission and gave it the job of rethinking the nomination system. Its 1971 report, cited an old adage: “The cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy.” With the legitimacy of the political system at stake, party leaders felt intense pressure to open up the presidential nomination process.

Before the 1972 election, the commission issued recommendations that the 2 parties must adopt. What emerged was a system of binding presidential primaries. George McGovern, who unexpectedly won the 1972 Democratic nomination, called the new primary system “the most open political process in our national history.”

Primaries & the Progressive Era

Beginning in 1972, the vast majority of the delegates to both the Democratic and Republican conventions would be elected in state-level primaries and caucuses. Delegates would be preselected by the candidates themselves to ensure their loyalty. This meant that for the first time, the people who chose the parties’ presidential candidates would be neither beholden to party leaders nor free to make backroom deals at the convention; rather, they would faithfully reflect the will of their state’s primary voters.

The path to the nomination no longer had to pass through the party establishment. Democratic National Committee chair Larry O’Brien called the reforms “the greatest goddamn changes since the party system.”

The Progressive-era began in 1901 and 1916, in Wisconsin, where primary elections were introduced. In adopting primaries, both parties substantially loosened their leaders’ grip over the candidate selection process — opening it up to more democracy — i.e voters.

In “The Politics of Unreason”, Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab described American parties as the “chief practical bulwark” against extremists. But Lipset and Raab published their book in 1970, just as the parties were embarking on the most dramatic reform of their nomination systems in well over a century. Humphrey would be the last presidential candidate to win the nomination without competing in primaries.

The Democrats, whose initial primaries were volatile and divisive, backtracked somewhat in the early 1980s, stipulating that a share of national delegates would be elected officials — governors, big-city mayors, senators, and congressional representatives — appointed by state parties rather than elected in primaries.

These “superdelegates,” representing between 15% and 20% of national delegates, would serve as a counterbalance to primary voters — and a mechanism for party leaders to fend off candidates they disapproved of. The Republicans, by contrast, were flying high under Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s. Seeing no need for superdelegates, the GOP opted, to maintain a more democratic nomination system.

Circumventing the party establishment was, it turned out, easier in theory than in practice. Capturing a majority of delegates required winning primaries all over the country, which, in turn, required money, favorable media coverage, and, crucially, people working on the ground in all states.

Some political scientists worried about the new system. Binding primaries were certainly more democratic but are they too democratic? By placing presidential nominations in the hands of voters, binding primaries weakened parties’ gatekeeping function, eliminating the peer review process and opening the door to outsiders.

Initially, these fears seemed overblown. Outsiders emerged: Jesse Jackson, the Civil rights leader, ran for the Democratic nomination in 1984 and 1988, Southern Baptist leader Pat Robertson (1988), television commentator Pat Buchanan (1992, 1996, 2000), and Forbes magazine publisher Steve Forbes ran for the Republican nomination (1996). But they all lost.

In the 23 years between 1945 and 1968, under the old convention system, only a single outsider (Dwight Eisenhower) publicly sought the nomination of either party. By contrast, during the first two decades of the primary system, 1972 to 1992, 8 outsiders ran (5 Democrats and 3 Republicans), an average of 1.25 per election; and between 1996 and 2016, 18 outsiders competed in one of the two parties’ primaries — an average of 3 per election. 13 of these were Republicans.

This primary system was especially vulnerable to a particular kind of outsider: individuals with enough fame or money to skip the “invisible primary.” In other words, celebrities.

Any candidate seeking to complete the grueling obstacle course of U.S. primaries needs allies among donors, newspaper editors, interest groups, activist groups, and state-level politicians such as governors, mayors, senators, and congressmen. In 1976, Arthur Hadley described this arduous process as the “invisible primary.” He claimed that this phase, which occurred before the primary season even began, was “where the winning candidate is actually selected.”

Parties are Gatekeepers

The real protection against authoritarians isn’t democracy but gatekeepers — such as political parties and party leaders. They select our presidential candidates.

Without innovations like political parties and their norms, the Constitution the Founders so carefully constructed in Philadelphia wouldn’t have survived.

Members of the party establishment — elected officials, activists, allied interest groups — aren’t necessarily locked out of the game. Without them, it’s nearly impossible to win the party’s nomination.

Trump’s Arrival

Trump’s stunning political success is a story of ineffective gatekeeping. Party gatekeepers failed at three key junctures: the “invisible primary,” the primaries themselves, and the general election.

With the new system, Trump had to compete in an intricate web of caucuses and primaries against 16 other candidates. Many of his rivals boasted the kind of résumé that had been the hallmark of successful candidates in the past. At the head of the pack was Florida governor Jeb Bush, son and brother of the former presidents. There were other governors, as well, including Wisconsin’s Scott Walker, Louisiana’s Bobby Jindal, New Jersey’s Chris Christie, and Ohio’s John Kasich, and several rising Republican stars — younger, media-savvy politicians such as Senators Marco Rubio and Rand Paul, who hoped to replicate. Texas, home to three of the last eight elected presidents, offered two more candidates: Senator Ted Cruz and former governor Rick Perry. Besides Trump, two other outsiders threw their hats into the ring: businesswoman Carly Fiorina and neurosurgeon Ben Carson.

Measured by the backing of governors, U.S. senators, and congressional representatives at the time of the Iowa Caucus, Trump finished dead last in the invisible primary. Jeb Bush won the invisible primary with 31 endorsements.

When the actual primary season began on February 1, 2016 (the day of the Iowa Caucus) Trump had no endorsements among Republican power brokers. The day of the South Carolina primary, Trump did not yet have a single endorsement from a sitting Republican governor, senator, or congressperson.

Conclusion

Party gatekeepers are shells of what they once were for two reasons:

  1. The dramatic increase in the availability of money due to the 2010 Citizens United ruling.
  2. The explosion of alternative media, particularly cable news and social media.

Science works by peer review. Company promotions also work by peer review. But democracy works by everyone getting a vote.

To your success,
Nikhil Mahadea

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Nikhil Mahadea

Read 631+ non-fiction books. I dream of a world where science is admired and politics is driven by data.